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“ALL (POOR) LIVES MATTER”: HOW CLASS-NOT-RACE LOGIC
REINSCRIBES RACE AND CLASS PRIVILEGE
Jonathan P. Feingold1
INTRODUCTION
In An Intersectional Critique of Tiers of Scrutiny, Professors Devon
Carbado and Kimberlé Crenshaw infuse affirmative action with an overdue
dose of intersectionality theory. Their intervention, which highlights the
disfavored remedial status of Black women, exposes equality law as an
unmarked intersectional project that “privileges the intersectional identities of
white antidiscrimination claimants.”
This latent racial privilege rests on two doctrinal pillars. First, single-axis
tiers of scrutiny, which force claimants and courts to view discrimination in
either/or terms (that is, race-based or gender-based or class-based), contravene
intersectionality’s core insight that “people live their lives co-constitutively as
‘both/and,’ rather than fragmentarily as ‘either/or.’” Equal-protection doctrine,
we might say, is “intersectionality-blind.”
Second, intersectional blindness exists alongside colorblindness—a racial
ideology hostile to race-conscious remedies. This pairing yields an equality
regime that favors intersectional subjects whose racial identity is decoupled
from their disadvantage (e.g., poor whites) and those who reap racial
advantage through the daily churn of ostensibly neutral “market forces” (e.g.,
class-privileged whites).
In this Essay, I draw upon An Intersectional Critique but shift the focus
from race and gender to race and class. Specifically, I refocus the intersectional
lens on an ongoing site of contestation: the argument that universities should
consider an applicant’s socioeconomic class but not her race—what I refer to
herein as “class-not-race” reforms. I make the class-race turn for three reasons.
First, we are witness to unrelenting wealth disparities and their searing
impact. The growing fissure between haves and have-nots exacerbates the
increasingly steep cost of university membership (itself a key to social
mobility). This tension calls on us to reckon with the causes and consequences
of class stratification. But wealth gaps have never been race neutral. If
anything, the ongoing pandemic and the economic crisis that followed throw
into sharp relief the thread that binds race and class (and life chances) in
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edits and feedback, and to Sean Hickey for research assistance that supported this
Essay.
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America. This moment demands a serious intersectional class and race
conversation.2
Second, we are heading towards a world of class-not-race university
admissions. Class-not-race policies already enjoy preferential status under
existing law.3 Given the Supreme Court’s rightward turn since Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin (2016), it is easy to imagine a future in which this
preference becomes a mandate.
Third, and my focus herein, class-not-race logic ultimately serves neither
poor whites nor people of color. To be sure, economically disadvantaged
students enjoy certain benefits under admissions regimes that attend to class
(relative to ones that do not). It is also true that poor whites, whose racial
identity neither compounds nor deepens their class disadvantage, are often
favored intersectional subjects under class-not-race frameworks. But in
meaningful respects, the modest racial privilege enjoyed by poor whites only
masks how class-not-race constitutionalism fortifies structural and
institutional arrangements that keep those on the top at the top, and those on
the bottom—poor whites included—at the bottom. In so doing, equality law
commits the ultimate intersectionality sin: reinforcing structural hierarchies.
I. Class-Not-Race: The Supreme Court’s Preferred Approach
Class-not-race reform enjoys preferential status within constitutional
doctrine and, often, public discourse. As a matter of doctrine, this preference
operates across and within tiers of scrutiny.4
To begin, racial classifications are subject to the most demanding tier of
judicial review: strict scrutiny. Class-conscious policies, in contrast, are subject
to the least demanding tier of judicial review: rational basis review. In other
words, the law is most hostile to race-conscious policies (even those also
attentive to class) and most deferential to class-conscious policies (unless they
also employ racial classifications).

Cf. Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 1593, 1635 (2011)
(“While the CRT literature on intersectionality and gender is far from complete, it is
much more robust than the CRT literature on intersectionality and class.”). A focus on
class and race need not displace other axes of identity. To the contrary,
intersectionality theory encourages a dynamic conversation attentive to how axes of
identity and structures of power interact.
2

3

See Part I.

Within this Essay, I focus on the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment equalprotection jurisprudence. The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private
universities, such as Harvard, which are governed by Title VI. These two legal regimes
are not identical. See Kimberly West-Faulcon, Obscuring Asian Penalty with Illusions
of Black Bonus, 64 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 590 (2017) (discussing disparate-impact
standards under Title VI regulations). Nonetheless, parties and courts often transport
the constitutional framework to Title VI challenges. See, e.g., Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard, 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 189, 195–96 (D. Mass. 2019).
4
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A second-layer preference exists within strict scrutiny itself. When subject
to strict scrutiny, a defendant must establish that its race-conscious policy is
“narrowly tailored”—a demand that requires, among other elements, the
absence of “race-neutral alternatives.” In the admissions context, litigants and
Justices often argue that class-not-race policies offer such alternatives.
As a matter of doctrine and policy, “[t]his formulation conceives of
considerations of class as possible, and even preferable, substitutes for raceconscious affirmative action policies.” As a practical matter, the doctrine
incentivizes universities to either avoid or dilute any race-conscious
components of their admissions regimes.5 Moreover, the suspect status of all
racial classifications—even those designed to desegregate our schools or
counter institutional legacies of racial exclusion—communicates that
antiracism is itself racist.6 In effect, and as I describe further below, this
constitutionalized class-not-race preference produces favored and disfavored
intersectional racial subjects.
II. Original Sin: Intersectional Blindness
We might consider intersectional blindness equality law’s original
intersectionality sin. Just as colorblindness trivializes (if not denies) the
ongoing relevance of race and racism, intersectional blindness betrays the
interactive nature of our identities (e.g., race and class) and structures of power
(e.g., racism and capitalism).7
In the admissions context, intersectional blindness facilitates the
presumption that one can cleanly disentangle an applicant’s race and class.
Put slightly differently, class-not-race “arguments obscure the fact that race
and class are coconstitutive yet distinct.” As a result, equality law overlooks
the many ways in which class is raced and race is classed.
A. When Class Is Raced
To say that class is raced is to suggest, at a minimum, that race mediates
the class experience of individuals and groups. This dynamic manifests in
multiple forms. Here, I address two: class mobility and class meaning.8

See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016) (describing
the University of Texas’s consideration of applicant race a “factor of a factor of a
factor”).
5

Or in the words of Chief Justice Roberts: “The way to stop discriminating on the basis
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
6

See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 79 (2019) (“Racial categories were invented to construct and maintain a white
supremacist regime built on racial slavery and capitalism, and those categories
continue to help govern systems in which racism has become embedded.”).
7

These examples are not exhaustive. For a more comprehensive review, see, e.g.,
Harris, Fisher’s Foibles; john a. powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional
8
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1. Class mobility.
For purposes of this Essay, I employ the term “class mobility” to capture a
person’s (or group’s) abilities (1) to accumulate wealth, and thereby ascend
class hierarchies, and (2) to maintain a higher class status once attained.9
The relevant backdrop is well known. For much of this country’s history,
legalized racism was weaponized to extract, hoard, and monopolize resources
that catalyzed generations of white economic, political, and social capital
accumulation. Redlining, for example, exemplifies how public policy facilitated
the inequitable distribution of key resources; white communities got access,
communities of color did not. But as Professor K-Sue Park has poignantly
observed, the story of redlining transcends uneven resource distribution. It is
also a story of racialized wealth creation. As Park describes, redlining
“engineer[ed] the mass-production of a new form of property whose value
derived precisely from the segregated landscape it produced—the suburban
single-family home.”
This legacy of racialized wealth accumulation transcends individuals and
communities. It also implicates America’s most prestigious educational
institutions—universities such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton—as profiteers
that leveraged slavery (and racism more broadly) to finance, and literally
construct, their educational empires.10
Inseparable from this history, whiteness remains a valued asset in
America. Proximity to it (and inclusion within it) grants access to
opportunities, resources, and networks that fuel the acquisition and retention
of wealth.11 It should be no surprise, therefore, that immigrant and ethnic
communities have long asserted their “whiteness” to improve their social,
legal, and economic standing.12
Beyond wealth accumulation, whiteness also buffers against wealth loss.
This dynamic has manifest in the racially uneven fallout triggered by the
current pandemic. The 2009 financial crisis bred similar results. Importantly,
this racial buffering transcends moments of acute societal economic decline. As
one salient example, race predicts whether children—even those born to

Perspective, 25 Law & Ineq. 355 (2007); Lisa R. Pruitt, The False Choice Between Race
and Class and Other Affirmative Action Myths, 63 Buff. L. Rev. 981, 982 (2015).
9

This definition is underinclusive, but sufficient for purposes of this Essay.

10

See Craig Steven Wilder, Ebony and Ivy (2013).

See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993); Laura
Gomez, Inventing Latinos 125 (2020); Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans,
Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (1999) (“[Mexicans were] in the
ethnoracial middle ground between Anglo Americans and African Americans, not
white enough to claim equality with Anglos and yet, in many cases, white enough to
escape the worst features of the Jim Crow South.”).
11

See Ian Haney Lopez, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (2006); Gomez,
Inventing Latinos 127 & n.104.
12
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wealthy parents—maintain class status or suffer economic decline during their
lifetimes.13
2. Class meaning.
By “class meaning,” I refer to dominant narratives concerning class in
America. Often, these narratives describe class status (who is poor) and explain
economic inequality (why the poor are poor). On the surface, common class
narratives are race-less. When we discuss the vulnerabilities of poverty (which
burden the poor) or the privileges of wealth (which benefit the rich), we conjure
a universalized class experience that transcends and, in ways underdescribes,
racial identity. Yet if we push at all, race—and the conceptual work it
performs—rises to the surface.
Consider how race informs conceptions of the “deserving” or “undeserving”
poor.14 This distinction is embodied by two phrases etched into the American
vernacular: “working class” and “welfare queen.” Both terms are facially race
neutral. Yet both are racially encoded and invoke divergent stories about
poverty’s causes and prescriptions.
“Welfare queen” conjures powerful associations between poverty,
Blackness (Black womanhood, in particular), and social deviance.15 Professor
Priscilla Ocen explains: “Black women have been viewed as an omnipresent
danger through designation as sexually promiscuous, incompetent mothers
and welfare queens who threaten society . . . their reproductive capacities are
deemed to be the source of crime, dependency, and disorder.” This racialized
class story has roots in the now-infamous Moynihan Report, which “suggested
that Black women as mothers were responsible for a ‘tangle of pathology’ that
engulfed the African-American community, spawning unemployment,
criminality, out of wedlock births, poverty, and the like.”
“Working class,” a term tethered to whiteness, offers a distinct picture of
the poor and their plight. The term evokes industrious laborers who suffer
class disadvantage in spite of their individual effort. Thus, whereas “welfare
queen” (read: Black woman) depicts culturally deficient subjects undeserving
of public assistance, the “working class” (read: poor whites) portrays an
honorable community that deserves a leg up.

See Raj Chetty et al., Race and Economic Opportunity in the United States: An
Intergenerational Perspective (2018) (link) (“[A] black child born to parents in the top
quintile is roughly as likely to fall to the bottom family income quintile as he or she is
to remain in the top quintile; in contrast, white children are nearly five times as likely
to remain in the top quintile as they are to fall to the bottom quintile.”).
13

See Khiara M. Bridges, The Deserving Poor, the Undeserving Poor, and Class-Based
Affirmative Action, 66 Emory L.J. 1049, 1092 (2017) (“[T]he line between the deserving
and undeserving poor has shifted to maintain black people on the undeserving side of
the binary.”).
14

Contrary to public perceptions, white Americans remain the largest beneficiaries of
government assistance.
15
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These legitimating myths do more than stigmatize Blackness and Black
communities. They also buttress a white middle-class identity moored to ideals
of independence, merit, and self-sacrifice. In this sense, our societal
preoccupation with “welfare queens” does more than denigrate Black poverty.
It also insulates the white middle-class from having to reckon with the
indelible link between white wealth and anti-Black racism (and genocide, and
internment, and conquest, the list goes on).
B. When Race Is Classed
Racial stereotypes are embroidered into America’s cultural fabric. As with
class narratives, racial stereotypes describe and explain racial hierarchy.
Stereotypes also inform how we perceive and interact with racialized
individuals and groups.16 Accordingly, when society associates race with
socioeconomic status, the relevant racial stereotypes—in effect—classes race.
Americans associate Blackness with poverty.17 Beyond informing how we
treat individual people, this link also affects how we evaluate entire
neighborhoods.
A 2008 study from Professor Maria Krysan and colleagues is instructive.18
Participants viewed one of thirteen videos, each of which depicted a
neighborhood across five socioeconomic tiers and three racial compositions.19
Notably, participants downgraded otherwise identical neighborhoods as the
proportion of Black residents increased—racially disparate treatment that
affected perceptions of property values and school quality. The researchers
explain: “[N]eighborhoods with the exact same observable characteristics
[were] presumed by Whites to be lower-quality neighborhoods simply because
of the race of the residents.”20
The foregoing discussion, albeit incomplete, explores the dynamic and
layered relationship that binds race and class. Even this partial review reveals
how intersectional blindness erases key dimensions of both. These erasures,
when fused to colorblindness, fuel a constitutional scheme that privileges the
experiences and remedial needs of white intersectional subjects.
III. Colorblind Intersectionality: Unmarked Racial Privilege
“Colorblind intersectionality,” a term coined by Carbado, refers to
“instances in which whiteness helps to produce and is part of a cognizable

See Galen Bodenhausen & Kurt Hugenberg, Attention, Perception and Social
Cognition, in Social Cognition: The Basis of Human Interaction (2009).
16

See Maria Krysan et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Racial Beliefs and Residential
Segregation, 5 Du Bois. Rev. Soc. Sci. Res. Race 1 (2008).
17

18

See Krysan, In the Eye of the Beholder.

See Krysan, In the Eye of the Beholder (racial composition was either (a) all white,
(b) all black, or (c) racially mixed).
19

20

Krysan, In the Eye of the Beholder.
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social category but is invisible or unarticulated as an intersectional subject
position.” This description captures class-not-race reforms, which formally
attend to class but not race. Given this discursive and prescriptive posture,
such policies are prone to privilege constitutional subjects whose economic
subordination is untethered to their racial identity—that is, poor whites.21 As
I discuss below, this relative privilege entails material and symbolic
dimensions.
A. Material Consequences: Remedial Gaps
The material impact of class-not-race reform depends, in large part, on
existing baselines. At least two baselines deserve note.
First, we should always ask: “As compared to what?” In the admissions
context, this translates to: “What is the alternative to class-not-race?”
Critically, the alternative to class-not-race is not race-not-class. Rather, the
alternative is almost always class-and-race: admissions regimes that permit
the formal consideration of a student’s race and class statuses.
Second, we should ask whether race-blind admissions are race-neutral
projects. In other words, absent racial affirmative action, do white applicants
enjoy racial advantages unavailable to similarly situated students of color? As
I and others have argued, the answer to this latter articulation is yes.22 Across
income brackets, whiteness confers racial advantages before and during the
admissions process.23
Against this backdrop, the racial preferences entailed by class-not-race
reform come into focus. To begin, class-not-race frameworks baseline to the
experience and remedial needs of poor whites—whose economic subordination
is decoupled from their racial status. Whiteness does not immunize poor whites
from the indignities of poverty. But as Cheryl Harris has observed, “whiteness
mitigates risk through racial/spatial structures that sort probabilities and
distribute access and opportunity.”

The relative racial privilege enjoyed by poor whites tracks historical expressions of
racism in this country. See Carbado, Critical What What?, at 1614 (“[H]istorically,
racism has been bi-directional: It gives to whites (e.g., citizenship) what it takes away
from or denies to people of color. Framing discrimination in this way helps to reveal
an uncomfortable truth about race and power: The disempowerment of people of color
is achieved through the empowerment—material or psychological—of whites.”).
21

See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Footnote 43: Recovering Justice Powell's Anti-Preference
Framing of Affirmative Action, 53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1117, 1140 (2019); Sam Erman
& Gregory M. Walton, Stereotype Threat and Antidiscrimination Law: Affirmative
Steps to Promote Meritocracy and Racial Equality in Education, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 307,
330–39 (2015); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1063, 1064 (2006); Luke Charles
Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential Treatment: A
Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11 Harv.
Blackletter L.J. 1 (1994).
22

23

See supra note 22.
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For poor people of color, whose disadvantaged subject position transcends
class status, class-not-race reforms comprise underinclusive remedial projects.
This is not to suggest that class consciousness is necessarily inattentive to
structural barriers confronted by the poor of all races. But as the experience of
institutions such as the University of California reveals, class-not-race
policies—in part due to their attenuated nexus to racial subordination—are illequipped to counter white racial advantages embedded within standard
admissions processes.24 The resulting remedial gaps, in turn, leave behind
those “on the bottom.” For class-not-race proponents who criticize racial
affirmative action for purportedly failing to uplift society’s “truly
disadvantaged,” these gaps should be cause for concern.25
Class-not-race reforms also privilege poor whites relative to middle- and
upper-class people of color—who remain subject to racial headwinds
notwithstanding their class privilege.26 To be sure, this gap is a feature—not a
bug—of class-not-race reforms. Moreover, it is often justified by the fallacy that
middle-class status insulates students of color from race-based disadvantage.27
Notably, this proposition is betrayed by class-not-race proponents
themselves. A salient example comes from an unexpected source: Students for
Fair Admissions (SFFA), the organizational plaintiff challenging Harvard
University’s admissions practices. SFFA alleges that Harvard discriminates
against Asian Americans to the benefit of white applicants—a claim tied to
race, not class. SFFA identifies implicit biases as a potential source of the
alleged disparate treatment. Assuming SFFA is correct, class-not-race reform
would do little to remedy this harm—nor would it address other advantages
white applicants enjoy vis-à-vis Asian Americans within, and before, Harvard’s
admissions process. To the contrary, and as I have argued elsewhere, a more
responsive remedy would involve a targeted “race-conscious policy capable of
redressing the specific harm of negative action” that disadvantages Asians

See William C. Kidder, How Workable Are Class-Based and Race-Neutral
Alternatives at Leading American Universities?, 64 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 100, 110–
11 (2016) (“The crux of the problem is that, as noted in many of the earlier studies,
although there is a meaningful positive correlation between race/ethnicity and
socioeconomic status, the correlation is not so strong that class can effectively
substitute for race.”).
24

See Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2232 (Alito, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the university’s
desire to admit more “privileged minorities . . . turned the concept of affirmative action
on its head”).
25

26 Devon W.

Carbado et al., Privileged or Mismatched: The Lose-Lose Position of African
Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate, 64 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 174, 199
(2016) (“[B]lack students across class, and not just class-disadvantaged black students,
experience multiple disadvantages that likely affect their academic performance and
the overall competitiveness of their admissions files.”).
Though as Professors Luke Harris and Uma Narayan observe, “[n]o one argues that
middle class status shields white women from the inequities that often result from
institutional sexism.” Harris & Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of
Preferential Treatment, at 9.
27
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relative to whites.28 Simply put, SFFA’s turn to implicit bias reveals the
inability of class-not-race policies to counter white racial advantages that
transcend class privilege.
B. Symbolic Consequences: All Poor Lives Matter
I do not mean to overstate the material benefits that poor whites enjoy
under class-not-race reforms.29 Given the demographic dynamics of university
applications and a baseline of class-and-race admissions, the impact on a poor
white student’s likelihood of admission is likely marginal at best.30
Even so, a constitutionalized class-not-race preference confers distinct and
meaningful psychological benefits to poor whites.31 When the Supreme Court
speaks, its words convey powerful symbolic and “cultural meaning.”32 By
embracing class-conscious policies and frowning upon race-conscious policies,
our highest judicial body projects a worldview that either denies racism’s
enduring presence or deems that reality constitutionally irrelevant or
insufficient to justify even modest race-conscious remedies.33
In a sense, the cultural meaning that animates class-not-race tracks that
embodied by the controversial phrase: “All Lives Matter”—or, tweaked for
present purposes, “All Poor Lives Matter.” In the abstract, “All Lives Matter”
constitutes a thin and innocuous platitude. But this phrase does not exist in
the abstract. It is a direct rebuke to Black Lives Matter—a resounding call to
name the inherent dignity of Black lives and condemn anti-Black violence and
anti-Black racism more generally. It is from this contestatory posture and
societal backdrop that All Lives Matter is cognizable. An otherwise empty
slogan emerges as a racial project that recenters whiteness by decentering
Blackness and denying (or shrugging off) anti-Blackness. Moreover, in ways
Moreover, a class-not-race regime at Harvard would harm the many Asian-American
applicants who benefit from Harvard’s current class-and-race policy.
28

See Harris, Fisher’s Foibles, at 681 (“[W]hiteness is no insurance against the effects
of structural inequality: Whites who are poor are solicited and summoned to the stage
to argue against race-conscious remediation, but their specific concerns are rarely if
ever addressed.”).
29

See generally Sherick Hughes et al., Causation Fallacy 2.0: Revisiting the Myth and
Math of Affirmative Action, 30 Educ. Pol’y 63 (2016) (concluding that were all African
Americans and Latinos removed from Harvard’s 2013 admissions pool, the likelihood
of white applicants being admitted would increase by 1 percent).
30

Whiteness’ psychological benefits extend to all whites but are often most meaningful
for the poor. See Harris, Fisher’s Foibles, at n.104.
31

Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 356 (1987) (proposing a “cultural meaning”
test that would “evaluate governmental conduct to see if it conveys a symbolic message
to which the culture attaches racial significance”).
32

Justice Anthony Kennedy is associated with the latter position. See Parents Involved
in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007). Chief Justice
Roberts, among others, appears to embrace the former. See id. at 748.
33
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that parallel equal-protection doctrine’s antipathy for racial classifications,
replacing the particularized Black with the universal All carries the accusation
that antiracism—that is, naming race and confronting racism—is the true
source of racism.
It requires only a slight lift to map the cultural meaning of All Lives
Matter onto class-not-race—a constitutional framework that proclaims “All
Poor Lives Matter.” Class-not-race constitutionalism did not arise in a
contextual vacuum. To the contrary, it constitutes a direct response to modest
gains for racial equality that followed the fall of Jim Crow—gains that included
a range of race-conscious remedies.34 And paralleling the turn from Black Lives
Matter to All Lives Matter, the Supreme Court’s turn to All Poor Lives Matter
symbolically centers whiteness by relegating concerns about anti-Blackness to
the margins of equality law. In effect, the Supreme Court contributes to, and
reinvests in, the psychological “wages of whiteness.”35
IV. Hidden Victors: Wealthy Whites and Elite Institutions
Up to this point, I have argued that class-not-race constitutionalism
privileges poor whites. This is only half true—true as to relative advantages
vis-à-vis people of color. The other half, to which I have gestured, exists in the
space between poor whites and those at the top: wealthy whites and elite
institutions—the ultimate beneficiaries of colorblind intersectionality.
A. Wealthy Whites
To begin, class-not-race appeals locate middle-class Blacks (and racial
classifications) as the admissions barrier for poor whites. In other words, the
class-not-race frame portrays a zero-sum game that pits poor whites (who
deserve admission) against “privileged” Blacks (who gain admission only
through “racial preferences”). This framing distorts the admissions
competition in two key regards. First, it discursively extracts middle- and
upper-class whites—who remain overrepresented at many elite institutions—
from the admissions competition.36 Second, it reinforces the contestable
proposition that admissions regimes are racially neutral projects until
universities formally consider applicant race. Taken together, these distortions
reinscribe class-privileged whites “as natural features of the [university]
landscape—presumed members of a university community admitted on their
individual ‘merit.’”

See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1363 (1988).
34

See Harris, Fisher’s Foibles, at 680 (“The wages of whiteness . . . are an expression
of the relative value of not being part of a group at the absolute bottom of the social
and economic hierarchy.”).
35

For those who would question the overrepresentation characterization, I might ask
how overrepresentation is not the inevitable outcome of, inter alia, legacy
preferences—which are untethered to merit, common at elite institutions, and
disproportionately benefit class-privileged whites.
36
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Two noteworthy consequences result. First, these distortions insulate
from meaningful critique the shallow yet routinize measures of merit that
systematically exclude talented and otherwise qualified students of color (and
poor whites). Class-privileged whites, in turn, receive a material benefit: an
uneven playing field that rewards inherited race and class privilege. Second,
race consciousness is maligned as a deviation from race-neutrality, not a
corrective for it. Class-privileged whites, in turn, receive a psychological
benefit: they can pass through a racially uneven admissions process without
having to confront the racial preferences they enjoy along the way.37
B. Elite Institutions
Class-not-race constitutionalism also benefits elite institutions to the
detriment of poor whites and people of color. To begin, universities benefit from
frames that shield from serious and sustained scrutiny institutional practices
that reward and reproduce accumulated race and class privilege. This includes
legacy preferences, an unpopular and antimeritocratic practice that
disproportionately benefits wealthy whites (via admission) and institutions
(via donor relations). Legacy preferences call for cross-racial resistance; classnot-race logic gets in the way.
But equality law does more than defuse potentially potent allyship. It also
safeguards elite universities from criticism from the Left. The Harvard
litigation is demonstrative. As noted above, SFFA claims that Harvard
discriminates against Asian Americans, perhaps because of implicit biases. In
the abstract, many progressives would reflexively support—or at least demand
further inquiry of—such claims (which are plausible given pervasive antiAsian stereotypes). But SFFA’s naked goal is to eliminate racial affirmative
action at Harvard and beyond—not to counter anti-Asian biases that pervade
society and elite institutions. For this reason, and given affirmative action’s
legal precarity, the Left has closed ranks around Harvard. This has included
vigorous denials of anti-Asian bias, even though that claim—even if proven—
would not implicate Harvard’s racial affirmative-action program. As a result,
and cloaked under the associational halo of civil-rights allies, Harvard avoids
the scrutiny that ought to follow a plausible claim of “negative action.”
Finally, class-not-race constitutionalism enables elite institutions to
portray themselves as racially progressive without taking meaningful steps to
advance racial justice. The Harvard litigation is again instructive. Juxtaposed
against SFFA’s openly regressive agenda, Harvard can brand itself as a
righteous defender of affirmative action and racial equality more broadly. In a
political moment marked by increasing calls for antiracist reform and
institutional accountability, brand matters—even for elites like Harvard. And
yet, this portrayal masks the limited intervention performed by raceconsciousness at Harvard and distracts from Harvard’s reluctance to part with
Note the parallels to the earlier discussion about racialized class narratives that
simultaneously (a) justify Black poverty (the ostensible product of cultural deficiencies,
not racial discrimination) and (b) legitimate white wealth (the ostensible product of
neutral market forces, not racial discrimination).
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institutional practices—such as legacy admits and an overreliance on
standardized tests—that confer racial (and class) preferences on wealthy
whites.
This, in turn, reveals class-not-race constitutionalism’s ultimate
intersectionality sin: the invisible reinscription of existing hierarchies.
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